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1.INTRODUCTION 
As long as the thoughts of individuals in society do not turn into words, they do not 
express any importance in terms of legal science. However, the statements of individuals, 
especially their harmful and hateful discourses which can play a role in increasing violence in 
society, fall within the field of legal science. Such statements sow a seed or an idea in the 
mind of someone who already has negative views or dangerous thoughts against specific 
groups or individuals. It harms us on an interpersonal, community and societal level. Hate 
speeches are normalized and accepted unless they have struggled. Thus, it is vital to combat 
hate speech.  
Despite the importance of combating hate speech, the question of how to deal with is 
difficult to answer. Because hate speech is a controversial social phenomenon. There are 
many debatable areas regarding hate speech such as, which expressions constitute hate 
speech, the definition of it and whether we should restrict it. These difficulties make the hate 
speech one of the most complex issues in the field of freedom of expression. Although being 
a fundamental human right and playing a vital role in realizing other rights, freedom of 
expression can be abused and in such situations, it can transfer into an opposite phenomenon. 
For instance, if an individual or group expresses ideas on superiority of a certain race, 
religion or nation, intending to humiliate all those not belonging to „their“ group, freedom of 
expression transfers into a hate speech. However, determining when an expression is 
permissible and within the scope of freedom of expression is a very sensitive matter. 
In this context, it will be interesting to examine the approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights (European Court, ECtHR), which is responsible for supervising the 
enforcement of the European Convention of Human Rights (Convention, ECHR), which 
requires the signatory states to guarantee freedom of expression. The European Court, in its 
decisions, strongly condemns expressions containing hatred of a certain category of citizens 
and tries to create standards between hate speech as a negative phenomenon and freedom of 
expression. The Court uses two approaches while dealing with this issue; the broader 
approach of exclusion from the protection of the Convention provided for by Article 17, so-
called abuse clause, and the narrower approach of restrictions on protection provided for by 
Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention. In its Article 10 approach, the European Court 
strikes a balance between the right to freedom of expression in Article 10/1 and the interests 
in Article 10/2. On the other hand, in its Article 17 approach, there is not a need for such a 
balancing process. Speech is mostly limited only because of its content. 
As a first step, this study will elaborate on the definitional and contextual arena of 
hate speech to provide a better understanding of the controversies of this phenomenon and the 
underpinnings of the ECtHR approach to it. Then it will proceed to look at the ECtHR case 
law and seeks to systematize the Court's case-law in the hate speech area.  In particular, it 
will analyse the application of Article 10 and Article 17 of the Convention in hate speech 
cases. The final aim is to reveal what are the specific controversies and shortcomings of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence relating to hate speech are, and what the court's ideal approach to these 
issues might be. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CONCEPT OF HATE SPEECH 
1. What is Hate Speech  
 
Hate speech is a kind of insult to a person because of his/her ethnic, race, religious or 
other groups to which he/she is a member of it. The aim of hate speech is generally to 
condemn the individual or group, or to express anger, hatred towards them.1 Hate speech as a 
concept, refers to the entire spectrum of negative discourse, ranging from expressing, 
promoting or encouraging hate to abusive expression and denigration, and to extreme forms 
of prejudice, stereotypes and bias.2 Practically, all racist, xenophobic, homophobic (and 
expressions related to other tendencies) discourses that include humiliation of identities can 
be classified as hate speech.3 Hate speech may be considered in various axes. It might be 
expressed orally, in writing or via the Internet.4 It might be direct; for instance, “Niggers go 
home. Making monkey noises and chanting racist slogans at soccer matches.”, “Serve your 
country, burn down a mosque.”5, “African, go back [to] eating bananas, monkey!” 6 are 
examples of direct hate speech. But it might also be indirect or veiled such as public use of 
insulting symbols, burning crosses, burning flags etc.7  
As can be inferred from the above-mentioned hate speech examples, hate speech 
causes harm to both society and individuals. It affects victims psychologically and 
emotionally in a negative manner. Victims feel humiliated, isolated, self-hatred and self-
doubt.8 Nicholas Wolfson suggests that  "such speech degrades the objects of abuse, silences 
them through fear, does them psychological damage and creates a smarmy and nauseating 
culture that harms women and minorities”.9 
Waldron notes that hate speech abuses vulnerable persons and breaks their sense of 
self. He mentions that it is both an object and a doing which has devastating effects on 
individuals and society. Hate speech represents violence by denying persons’ dignity and 
reputation. It makes people feel insecure physically, psychologically and economically.10 It 
also makes the victim groups fearful, angry and suspicious towards other groups. This divides 
                                                 
1 Elena Mihajlova, Jasna Bacovska, Tome Shekerdjiev, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech (2013) 24 
2 Ibid 25 
3 Ibid 24 
4 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Understandıng Words That Wound (2004) 13 
5 Bhikhu Parekh, Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?,  Public Policy Research, Vol. 12 Issue 4 (2006) 
215 
6 Hate Crime and Hate Speech in Europe:  Comprehensive Analysis of International Law Principles, EU-wide 
Study and National Assessments: Words are Weapons, available at; https://sosracismo.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Hate-Crime-and-Hate-Speech-in-Europe.-Comprehensive-Analysis-of-International-
Law-Principles-EU-wide-Study-and-National-Assessments.pdf 
7 Mihajlova, Bacovska, Shekerdjiev ( n 1) 25 
8 Ibid 33 
9 Nıcholas Wolfson, Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech (1997) 2 
10 Karen Zivi, Doing Things With Hate Speech,(Understanding and regulating hate speech: A symposium on 
Jeremy Waldron’s The Harm in Hate Speech) Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 13(2012) 95 
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society and reduces the quality of life of it.11 In addition, this divisiveness harms equal and 
healthy participation of everyone to the democratic processes and this makes the society 
fragile.12 
Despite these so many harmful effects, statistics demonstrate that hate speech has 
been increasing in Europe. For example, the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency 
surveyed on experiences and perceptions of anti-Semitism in Europe in December 2018. 
Accordingly, 89% of Jews living in European countries feel anti-Semitism has increased in 
their country over the past decade. About half of the respondents mentioned that they are 
worried about being insulted or harassed in public because of being Jewish and more than a 
third mentioned their fear of being physically attacked. Moreover, Anti-Semitic crimes, 
which include hate speech, increased  by 20%, according to government data in Germany in 
2018. A recent report by France’s National Human Rights Advisory Committee found that, in 
2018, anti-Semitic acts in France rose more than 70% compared to the previous year.13 
Although its great negative influence on both individuals and society, and its 
remarkable increase in recent years, there are still certain controversies in this area. One of 
the most important of these is that there is still no universal and generally accepted definition 
of hate speech.14  
2. Attempts To Define Hate Speech 
 
There have been academic and legal attempts to define hate speech. As a legal attempt 
to define “hate speech”, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers” in its 
Recommendation 97(20), defined it as follows: “the term “hate speech” shall be understood 
as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: 
intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and 
hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”15 
The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union ("FRA) attempted to define 
"hate speech," expressed, "Hate speech' refers to the incitement and encouragement of hatred, 
discrimination or hostility towards an individual that is motivated by prejudice against that 
person because of a particular characteristic…”16 
United Nations in its strategy and plan of action on hate speech defines hate speech 
as; “any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses 
pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of 
                                                 
11 Mihajlova, Bacovska, Shekerdjiev (n 1) 33 
12 Önder Bakırcıoğlu, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech, Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International 
Law, Volume 16 Issue 1 (2008) 5 
13 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/04/alarming-rise-anti-semitism-europe, accessed 20.07.2019 
14 Anne Weber, Manual On Hate Speech (2009) 9 
15 Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on 
"Hate Speech" 
16 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Hate Speech and Hate Crimes against lgbt persons 1 
(2009),available athttp://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Factsheet-homophobia-hate-speech-crimeEN.pdf. 
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who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, 
descent, gender or other identity factor.”17 
Although the term “hate speech” is found in the case-law of ECtHR, the Court has 
never given a precise definition of hate speech. The Court, in some of its judgments, simply 
refers to “all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on 
intolerance (including religious intolerance).”18 
Instead of a clear definition, UN Human Rights Council gave some formulations such 
as; ‘intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement 
to violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief’, or ‘the spread of 
discrimination and prejudice,’ or ‘incitement of hatred’.19 
Academics, on the other hand, define it for a range of different ends. They often shape 
their definitions in line with their specific motivations. Some call for legal sanctions and tries 
to guide legislators and courts, some do not seek to make hate speech illegal and seeks only 
to understand the phenomenon, some are in between.20 Richard Delgado, for example, 
mentions that, for a discourse to be a racial hate discourse, there are conditions that the 
complainant should prove. Accordingly;” Language was addressed to him or her by the 
defendant that was intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood 
as intended to demean through reference to race; and that a reasonable person would 
recognize as a racial insult.”21 
Mari J. Matsuda mentions about three identification criteria for racist hate speech:   
“1) the message is “of racial inferiority; 2) the message is “directed against a historically 
oppressed group; 3) the message is “prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”22 
Matsuda’s approach seems clearer than Delgado’s because it tries to reveal the 
elements of hate speech more concretely.  According to Matsuda, the speech must “deny the 
personhood of target group members,” and treat all persons in this group as “alike and 
inferior.” Also, the victim can only be the historically oppressed groups. Finally, the speech 
must be harmful.23  
To sum, as it can be seen from the variety of definitions,  the term hate speech has 
remained controversial. The lack of a consensus on the definition of hate speech makes it 
difficult to determine when an expression constitutes hate speech. When a law is vague, we 
                                                 
17United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech ( May 2019) available at: 
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/UN%20Strategy%20and%20Plan%20of%20Action%20o
n%20Hate%20Speech%2018%20June%20SYNOPSIS.pdf 
18 Weber ( n 14)  9 
19 Clotilde Pegorier,  Speech and Harm: Genocide Denial, Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression, 
International Criminal Law Review, 18 (2018) 97-126, 111 
20Andrew F Sellars, Defining Hate Speech (December 8,2016) 16 Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2882244 
21 Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. 
C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982) 179 
22 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 Michigan Law 
Review Vol.87 (1989) 2357 
23 Sellars ( n 20) 16 
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cannot know what utterances and actions to avoid in advance. This gives too much power to 
courts. Because of this, hate speech must be defined very carefully and clearly.24 The lack of 
universally accepted criteria for the determination of hate speech might be remedied by the 
further development of case law at the national and international level.25  
3. Banning Hate Speech: Free Speech Versus Hate Speech 
 
Another debatable area related to hate speech is whether hate speech should be 
banned. There are some reasons why it should. Such a law provides assurance not only to the 
victim group but to all members of society. The law legitimizes the political community in 
the targeted group’s eyes and gets the right to its loyalty. It also gives clear messages to 
individuals related to an acceptable way of talking about and treating other individuals or 
groups. In addition, once a climate of hatred and violence against certain groups spreads and 
this damages the relationship between different groups, it also harms the public support to the 
law. Prohibiting hate speech has a significant impact on preventing political mobilization of 
hostility against certain groups.26 In addition, there is a consensus on eliminating racism, 
bigotry, and discrimination in all its forms that encourage hate speech and hate crimes.27 
However, any valid solution to eliminate hate speech must take into consideration the delicate 
balance between free speech and other competing values (such as non-discrimination and 
equality) in each case.28  
Free speech is of vital importance for democratic societies. It is also a basic right for 
individuals that enables them to create and improve their opinions, and thereby to realize 
themselves.29 It is crucial for democratic societies and it is of vital importance for the 
enjoyment of many other freedoms.30 By exercising this right we can decide who we are, to 
speak our minds, get information, vote, elect the government and question them, and 
influence our environment so that we can rule our lives.31 Nevertheless, freedom of 
expression is not an absolute right. It may be subject to limitations.32 To acknowledge the 
possibility that there may be circumstances in which other benefits outweigh freedom of 
expression is consistent with the high value of free speech in democratic societies.33 
However, there are other opinions and theories which oppose a legal ban on hate speech and 
put forward arguments on behalf of unlimited free speech. 
                                                 
24 Parekh ( n 5) 222 
25 Bakırcıoğlu ( n 12) 4 
26 Parekh ( n 5) 218 
27 Kevin Boyle, Overview of a Dilemma: Cencorship Versus Racism, in Sandra Coliver, Striking a Balance, 
Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (eds) (1992) 1 
28 Ibid 1 
29 Handyside v. United Kingdom [gc], 7 December 1976, European Court of Human Rights, no. 5493/72, Series 
A no. 24, para. 49, <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57499>  accessed 16 July 2019 
30 In a General Assembly resolution it was stated that "[freedom of information is a fundamental human right 
and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.... G.A. Res. 59 (1), T 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/I (Dec. 14, 1946). 
31 Ricardo Restrepo, Democratic Freedom of Expression, Open Journal of Philosophy  Vol.3, No.3 (2013) 380 
32 Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khaled Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY (David Kretzmer and Francine Kershman Hazan eds., Kluwer L. 
Int'l. 2000) 147 
33 Boyle (n 27) 1 
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Opponents of the legal ban on hate speech claim various reasons. The most commons 
are these: The first argument is that the free speech has a high value in democratic societies. 
It is like blood of democracy. In order to limit free speech, there must be very important 
reasons such as national security, public order, and vital state interests. The damage done by 
hate speech is relatively minor in its extent and intensity, and its toleration is a small price to 
pay in the larger interest of free speech and democracy. Although it has some merits, the 
argument is not convincing. Because we rightly proscribe obscenity, libel, defamation, public 
display of pornography and public advertisement of sexual service. Thus we live public life 
with certain norms. Social harmony, equality of treatment and the right to live one’s life 
without harassment and intimidation are also significant values. Free speech does not 
automatically overweight these values and needs to be balanced.34 
The second argument is that the evils can be defeated not by proscribing them. The 
best way is answering them with counter-arguments.35 According to the ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ theory, free speech is significant because individuals can find the truth by the free 
competition of ideas.36 In addition, the restriction of free speech and free discussion prevents 
individuals to reach better conclusions and blocks society. The collective nature of free 
speech facilitates the interchange of ideas and provides better conditions to find the truth and 
construct better ideas. 37 The rationale of this idea is mentioned by John Stuart Mill; 
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can 
certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. 
 Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, 
contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is 
rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the 
remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. 
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is 
suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those 
who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of 
its rational grounds.38 
Admittedly, in a democratic society, free expression and competition of ideas is 
necessary and important for achieving reality and making progress. However, it should be 
noted that in many societies there are inequalities and vulnerable groups, namely ethnic and 
religious minorities, immigrants or women, who do not have sufficient access to speech 
channels. 39 Competition between ideas can be fair only if the parties enjoy equal access to 
the market place, including the popular media and other agencies by which they are 
                                                 
34 Parekh ( n 5)  219 
35 Ibid 219 
36 Philippe Yves Kuhn, Reforming the Approach to Racial and Religious Hate Speech Under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review (2019) 122 
37 Nıhal Jayawıckrama, The Judıcıal Applıcatıon of Human Rıghts Law: Natıonal, Regıonal and Internatıonal 
Jurısprudence (2002) 666 
38 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (2001) 50 
39 Bakırcıoglu ( n 12) 11 
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communicated and critically engage with each other. This is rarely the case. Moreover, if 
racist and xenophobic ideas become an integral part of a society’s culture, they enjoy a built-
in advantage over their opposites.40 This might pave the way to the domination of the 
powerful in the marketplace of ideas. Therefore, states can limit speech without being too 
intrusive.41 
The third argument is related to political participation. Meiklejohn, argues that 
freedom of expression applies to “those activities of thought and communication by which 
we govern.” He mentions that; ‘“the people need free speech” because they have decided. . . 
to govern themselves rather than to be governed by others’.42 According to this argument, 
hate speech has a chilling effect on public debate and discussion. Unlimited expression of 
opinions is a good thing and nothing should be done to put it at risk.43 The argument depends 
on the slippery slope metaphor which claims once we start exceptions we cannot know where 
to stop.44 However, if it was true, we could not make any exception to any principle. For 
example, we proscribe defamation of individuals without jeopardizing fair critical comment. 
Furthermore, in many societies which ban hate speech, public debate remains robust and does 
not show ‘chilling effect’.45 
Fourthly it is claimed that the discretion to judge the content of speech, to determine 
whether a speech, is good or bad, should be allowed or not, gives States an excessive power. 
It is also dangerous for individual liberties. This argument is flawed because it is wrong that 
the state has no right to judge the content of speech. States enjoy the right to restrict speech in 
the interest of other values which also have great importance. A ban on hate speech does not 
damage the moral neutrality of the state because it extends to all forms of hate speech 
irrespective of it has been expressed whether by a black or white racist. Moreover, a state 
which gives importance to human dignity, gender and race equality, or the spirit of free 
inquiry needs to act against forms of speech or behavior that defend and discredit them.46  
The fifth argument asserts that human beings are autonomous and they can and should 
be trusted to see through hate speech.47 According to the Scanlon who presents individual 
autonomy account, any theory of free speech must be valid for ‘expression in general’ rather 
than applying to any particular category of rights like political rights. He argues that the value 
of freedom of expression comes from its role in the improvement of individual autonomy and 
self-fulfilment. This account of free speech is very broad and vague.48 In addition, although it 
is clear that government interference might affect individual autonomy and liberty, this 
                                                 
40 Parekh ( n 5) 219 
41 Bakırcıoglu ( n 12) 11 
42 Bakırcıoglu ( n 12) 11 
43 Parekh ( n 5) 220 
44 Frederick Schauer, 'Slippery Slopes', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 99, 1985. 
45 Parekh ( n 5) 220 
46 Parekh ( n 5) 220 
47 Ibid 221 
48 Kuhn ( n 36) 121 
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account fails to consider the harms of hate speech and possible negative impacts of these, on 
the victim’s self-fulfilment and personal development.49 
The last argument is that suppressing speech might conceal the facts that society 
faces. Suppressing of expression leads to society's inability to see the facts and social 
problems. Over time, society becomes dissatisfied with its governors which is the actual basis 
of social unrest. Free speech and competition of ideas, therefore, is considered as "a method... 
of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."50 
This view, however, omits the devastating effects of hate speech, which might trigger the 
violent attacks against vulnerable groups and seriously harm the reputation of them. While it 
may strongly be argued that free speech can provide a better understanding of the prevailing 
problems in a society, the protection of human life, equality, non-discrimination should also 
be protected. This protection may sometimes require certain restrictions on freedom of 
expression.51 
These theoretical debates in the context of free speech and hate speech have also 
manifested themselves in practice. The European Court of Human Rights and the US 
Supreme Court, which are the two most influential regional human rights mechanisms, have 
developed completely different approaches in hate speech cases. 
a. The U.S Approach to Hate Speech: 
 
In the United States, tolerating hate speech is seen as a price to pay to guarantee 
freedom of expression.52 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......”53 
The United States Supreme Court, through its decisions, has expanded the guarantees of 
freedom of expression which is adopted in the First Amendment.54 In this context, Ronald 
Dworkin stated that: "The United States stands alone even among democracies, in the 
extraordinary degree to which its Constitution protects freedom of speech and of the press.”55 
This belief mostly depends on the above mentioned “marketplace of ideas” theory.56 
The United States protects nearly all forms of speech under the First Amendment, 
with only some narrow exceptions. The First Amendment guarantees a big amount of 
freedom of expression. It protects most speech –even profane or offensive- except in very 
                                                 
49 Bakırcıoğlu ( n 12) 9 
50 Franklyn S. Haiman, Freedom of Speech  (nat'l textbook co. 1979) 205 
51 Bakırcıoglu ( n 12) 12 
52 Ibid 14 
53 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
54 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and European 
Approaches, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Volume 7 Issue 2 (1999) 309 
55 Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (1992) 55. 
56 Bakırcıoglu ( n 12) 14 
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specific circumstances.57 The United States has very few laws that prohibit hate speech 
compared to European countries such as France, Germany, Austria, and Poland. 58  
The high degree to which freedom of expression protected can be seen in the case-law 
of the Supreme Court. For example, in the well known American case of Collin v. Smith, the 
planned march of the Neo-Nazis to a suburb called Skokie was restricted. The Neo-Nazis had 
chosen the place precisely because a large number of Holocaust survivors were living there. 
According to the Court, the march was a protected speech. Thus the Court invalidated the 
anti-defamation law by which the national authorities sought to prevent the march. The Court 
found that the sort of expression of Neo-Nazis was the necessary price of liberty in 
America.59 
Additionally in its R.A. V v. City of St. Paul case, the defendant R.A.V. was charged 
under the St.Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance because of the burning of a crudely made 
cross on the lawn of a black family that had moved into a formerly all white neighborhood. 
The Court did not approve the city regulation which criminalized placing a symbol on public 
or private property that aroused "anger, alarm [,] resentment..'. on the basis of race, colour, 
creed, religion, or gender." The Court decided that St. Paul’s prohibition was not necessary in 
order to protect the rights of individuals who have historically been discriminated against. 
The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional and that the charge must be dismissed. 
According to the Court, the local law violated the free speech guarantee of the First 
Amendment because it "prohibited... speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech 
addressed.”60 
The U.S Supreme Court currently excludes, from the protection of First Amendment, 
only three types of speech; obscenity, defamation and speech that creates “clear and present 
danger”.61 In its Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire case, the Court established the “fighting 
words” exception. Accordingly, words with little social value and that are likely to cause a 
breach of the peace are not protected under the First Amendment. In addition in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio case, the Court expressed that states can restrict speech that aims to produce 
"imminent lawless action" and is likely to produce such action.62 
To sum, it can be seen that U.S Supreme Court provides protection for a wide range of 
speech in the scope of the First Amendment and restrict free speech only in exceptional 
situations. 
 
                                                 
57 Anne-Marie Beliveau,  "Hate Speech Laws in the United States and the Council of Europe: The Fine Balance 
between Protecting Individual Freedom of Expression Rights and Preventing the Rise of Extremism and 
Radicalization through Social Media Sites." Suffolk University Law Review, vol. 51, no. 4 (2018) 569 
58 Ibid 569 
59 Douglas- Scott (n 54) 308  
60 Beliveau ( n 57) 571 
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b. The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach: 
 
 The ECHR is rooted in an understanding that is more favoured with balancing private 
and public interests, protecting the dignity and equality of all citizens and guaranteeing that 
the attributes of democratic government are preserved.63 In the same vein, The European 
Court’s approach to hate speech ‘"reflects the devotion of this Court to building standards 
and principles that are based on protecting the equality and dignity of all citizens through the 
application of the test of balancing private and public interests" 64 
 Although the Convention does not contain a specific provision which clearly 
prohibits certain forms of speech which could be deemed as hate speech and legally limited 
as such,65 in conformity with the above-mentioned counter-arguments to unlimited free 
speech theories, the CoE allows for the application of specific hate speech laws created after 
World War II and the Holocaust.66 In most European States, inciting racial hatred is viewed 
as highly dangerous and punishable. A book which only questions the Holocaust can be 
evaluated in that context.67 
According to the case-law of ECtHR, it is clear that expressions which can be 
insulting to a specific individual or group cannot be considered within the scope of freedom 
of expression. Thus, there is an obligation to avoid gratuitously offensive expressions which 
do not have any positive impact on any kind of public debate capable of furthering progress 
in human affairs.68  
The European Court first used the term ‘hate speech’ without definition or explanation 
in its Sürek v.Turkey (No.1), Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey, Sürek v.Turkey (no.4) and 
Erdoğdu v.Turkey cases. In these and afterwards cases the Court has understood ‘hate speech’ 
as all forms of expression which spread, promote, incite or justify hatred based on 
intolerance69 and  has not explicitly defined hate speech.70  
  The European Court uses two primary approaches while dealing with cases related to 
incitement to hatred;71 one approach is the prohibition of abuse of rights, Article 17 of 
ECHR. Accordingly, the Court excludes the person from the protections of the Convention 
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because the speech at issue counteracts the basic values of the Convention. The other 
approach is that the Court limits individual’s freedom of expression72 within the exceptional 
conditions provided for by Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention (this approach is 
applied where the speech in question, although it is hate speech, is not apt to destroy the 
fundamental values of the Convention)".73 
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CHAPTER 2 
-APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 10 IN HATE SPEECH CASES 
1. Freedom of expression under the ECHR 
Freedom of expression has  special importance among other rights which are granted 
in ECHR. Because it is one of the roots of democracy and it fosters democracy continuously. 
Without free debates and the freedom to express opinions, democracy cannot progress and 
exist.74 The ECHR, as the most important human rights instrument for European Countries, in 
its Article 10, guarantees freedom of expression for everyone. It states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. [...] 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
 The significance of freedom of expression has been mentioned by the European Court 
in its judgment Handyside. The Court affirmed that “freedom of expression constitutes one of 
the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for 
the development of every man”. The Court also gave the formula which is still used, that 
““subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to “information” or 
“ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness without which there is no 
“democratic society”75 
2. Principles of Restricting Freedom of Expression 
Although freedom of expression has a great value in democratic societies, it has to be 
limited if it encroaches upon other rights. The principles of restricting freedom of expression 
-limits of limitations- is mentioned in above-mentioned Article 10/2 of ECHR and can be 
found in the case law of ECtHR. Accordingly, a limitation must : (a) be provided by law,      
b) pursue one of the legitimate aims expressly and exhaustively enumerated in article 10/2,  
c) be necessary in a democratic society. 
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a. The Principle of Legality: 
 
A limitation on freedom of expression requires the principle of legality. It must be 
provided by law. The word of the law in the Convention does not only refer to the official 
activities of the legislature. It also includes case-law, Government and other regulations and 
the rules of international law. The significant point is the compliance of the rule with the two 
criteria which demonstrates the quality of law; the law’s foreseeable and accessible 
character.76 
According to the ECtHR, a law is accessible if it provides sufficient indicators to the 
citizens with regard to which legal rule is applicable in a concrete case. For example, the 
publication of the rules is an important element of accessibility.77 
A law is foreseeable if it is formulated with adequate precision to make sure the 
individuals to regulate his conduct. It must be predictable and an individual must be able to 
foresee, to some extent that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which an act 
may entail.78 
According to the ECtHR domestic law should meet the clarity requirement. It must 
prevent arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention. The law in question must also be precise. These criteria which are determined in 
the case-law of ECtHR are crucial in terms of preventing arbitrary interference of national 
authorities to freedom of expression. Hate speech legislation, therefore, needs to be clear, 
foreseeable, precise and accessible in order to meet the criteria of prescription by law.79 
b. The Principle of Legitimacy 
 
The second criterion of the analysis of interference is whether the interference pursues 
a legitimate aim. There are six legitimate aims in limiting freedom of expression which are 
exhaustively enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 10. These are; a) Protection of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, b) Prevention of disorder or crime, c) Protection 
of health or morals, d)Protection of reputation or rights of others, e) Preventing of disclosure 
of information received in confidence, and f) Maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.80 
In its Otto-Preminger v. Austria case, for example,  the Australian authorities’ seizure 
of a film in a highly Catolig part of the country,  was upheld by the Court. Because the film 
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was extremely offensive to the Catholics. The Court assessed that the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others as a legitimate aim in that case.81 
c. The Principle of Democratic Necessity 
In addition to legitimacy and legality, the restriction must be necessary in a 
democratic society, in order to be an acceptable limitation of freedom of expression. The 
necessity in a democratic society is the main test which the Court applies in such cases. 82 
 There are three criteria while assessing the necessity of the measure. These are;          
a) existence of a pressing social need, b) advancement of ‘relevant and sufficient reasons for 
the limitation, c) proportionality of the measure.83 The Court explained whether these criteria 
are met in its Zana v. Turkey case and stated that;  
“it must look at the impugned interference in the light of the case as a whole, including the 
content of the remarks held against the applicant and the context in which he made them. In 
particular, it must determine whether the interference in issue was "proportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued" and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to 
justify it are "relevant and sufficient." In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the 
national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles 
embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based themselves on an acceptable 
assessment of the relevant facts.”84 
Some authors argue that, of these three criteria, the Court, in fact, only applies the 
proportionality while assessing necessity, in its case-law. In any event, it is clear that the third 
criterion has been analyzed by the Court more often and in a detailed way.85 According to the 
Court, proportionality is the achievement of a fair balance between conflicting interests.86 
Even where the Court considers the existence of hate speech, it always reviews the 
proportionality of the measure. 87  
In its Sürek v Turkey case, for example, the applicant was the owner of a political 
weekly journal which published two readers’ letter condemning military actions of the 
Turkish authorities against Kurdish population. Turkish domestic courts convicted the 
applicant following the Turkish Criminal Code with the accusation of “disseminating 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the State and provoking enmity and hatred among the 
people”. The Court stated that “the impugned letters amounted to an appeal to bloody 
revenge and that one of them had identified persons involved in military operations by name, 
exposing them to the possible risk of physical violence”. The court noted the presence of hate 
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speech and the glorification of violence. After determined the hate speech the Court also 
examined the proportionality of the measure and found the measure taken by authorities 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.88 
The Court takes into account various factors while assessing proportionality. For 
example, in its Incal v. Turkey case, the existence of alternative means was examined. In this 
case, a demand for authorization was submitted to the authorities before the distribution of 
the impugned leaflets. According to the Court, the authorities could have required changes to 
the leaflet before having recourse to a criminal sanction. Failing this, the Court noted the 
radical nature of the impugned interference and points out that ‘its preventive aspect by itself 
raises problems under Article 10.’89 
The Court also examines the nature of the sanctions while assessing proportionality. 
In its Erbakan v. Turkey case, the Court found the penalties very harsh for a well-known 
politician. The penalty for the applicant was one year imprisonment and being banned from 
exercising several civil and political rights. The Court decided that freedom of expression of 
the applicant had been violated.90 
The Court, while examining whether these criteria regarding limitations of freedom of 
expression is met in a concrete case, allows a limited “margin of appreciation” to the national 
authorities.91 
3. The Role of Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Article 10: 
According to Takahashi, “margin of appreciation” refers to the latitude which a 
government is entitled to assessing factual situations and in applying the rules defined in 
international human rights treaties.92 The doctrine has been developed to find a balance 
between national perspectives of human rights and the uniform standards of Convention 
values. The doctrine requires to consider the social, cultural and economic conditions of each 
society.93  
The court has developed this doctrine, taking into account the principle of subsidiarity 
of the Convention’s human rights protection system.94 In its Handyside judgment, the Court 
noted that States have a margin of appreciation while assessing the necessity of interference 
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because a national judge is in a more advantageous position to assess the existence of 
pressing social needs than an international judge.95 
For instance, in its Simunic v.Croatia case which was related to ethnic hatred, the 
Court allowed certain discretion to national authorities. In this case, the applicant was a 
footballer and was convicted because of addressing messages which expressed hatred based 
on race, nationality, and faith, to spectators of a football match. The applicant claimed that 
his freedom of expression had been violated. The Court considered the modest nature of the 
fine imposed and the context in which he had shouted the impugned phrase. According to the 
court, the national authorities had established a fair balance between freedom of expression 
and society’s interests in promoting tolerance and mutual respect at sports and acted within 
the margin of appreciation.96 
 
4. Elements Taken into Account by the Court in Hate Speech Cases: 
The court considers the interference “in the light of the case as a whole” when it 
encounters a restriction on freedom of expression in a case before it. Thus the decision of the 
court is based on the special circumstances of the case and there is not only one factor which 
determines what is allowed and what is not. There are several elements which are assessed on 
a case by case basis.97 
The first criterion used by the Court is the purpose pursued by the applicant. However, 
it is a delicate and difficult issue to determine an individual’s intent to spread hatred against a 
certain group. Because of that, the Court refers to the content and context of the expressions 
in which they are disseminated.98 
a. The purpose pursued by the applicant: 
The intent lay behind the hate speech expressions is to incite, promote or justify 
hatred against the members of certain groups (racial, religious or ethnic group, LGBT 
community, etc.).99 The main issue is to determine whether the applicant intended to spread 
racist ideas and opinions through hate speech or whether he/she intended to inform the public 
on issues of general interest. The answer to this question determines whether or not an 
expression is shocking and offensive, but falls within the scope of Article 10.100 
In its Jersild v Denmark case the Court found that; the purpose of the applicant, who 
was convicted for the broadcasting of racist statements, had been to expose “specific aspects 
of a matter that already then was of great public concern.” Therefore the Court  considered 
that “taken as a whole, the feature could not objectively have appeared to have as its purpose 
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the propagation of racist views and ideas”.101 In this decision, the Court found a violation of 
freedom of expression because according to the Court the applicant had no racist intention.102 
In its Garaudy v. France decision, the Court examined incitement to racial hatred in 
the scope of Article 10/2. The Court emphasized that criticism of the State of Israel or any 
other State clearly falls within an individual’s freedom of expression. However, according to 
the Court, the applicant’s intent was not such criticism. His intent was in fact pursuing a 
racist aim.103  
In above-mentioned decisions the Court attempted to clarify the purpose of the 
applicant about whether the applicant tried to inform the public on a public interest matter. If 
so the Court finds the interference is not necessary in a democratic society. Conversely, if the 
expressions’ aim is incitement to hatred and violence, the Court allows national authorities a 
wider margin of appreciation while assessing the need for an interference with the exercise of 
freedom of expression.104 For instance in its Halis Doğan v Turkey case, the Court pointed 
out that the newspaper article can be regarded as incitement to violence. The Court stated” 
“the comments expressed in the text stirred up primal instincts and reinforced already 
anchored prejudices, that expressed themselves with a deadly violence”. The Court 
considered the margin of appreciation of the national authorities and found the interference 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.105 
b. Content of the expression: 
Content means, “the subject or ideas contained in something written, said, created, 
or represented”106. The Court examines speech or other contents (written text, drawing, 
cartoon etc.) by which a person has expressed his views while deciding on a concrete case.107 
For example, it gives specific importance to the truthfulness of expression in question. Thus it 
distinguishes between issues that “are part of an ongoing debate among historians” and 
“clearly established historical facts.”108 Denying the clearly established historical fact of the 
Holocaust was not protected in the scope of Article 10. According to the Court, such a denial 
has an aim which is prohibited under Article 17 of the Convention. In its Garaudy decision, 
the court stated that; “there can be no doubt that denying the reality of clearly established 
historical facts, such as the Holocaust, as the applicant does in his book, does not constitute 
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historical research akin to a quest for the truth”. The Court decided that the applicant cannot 
rely on the provisions of Article 10.109 
c. Context of the Expression: 
Context means “the situation within which somethingexists or happens, and that 
can help explain it”.110The context of the expression plays an important role when reviewing 
the application of Article 10. Because the Court considers the contextual factors which 
encompass the expression such as the author, form, and impact of the speech while assessing 
the proportionality of the measure imposed on the applicant.111 
The Court examines the context of the specific circumstances of every expression. 
The context is evaluated in terms of whether the expression was made in public debate as an 
exchange of conflicting views and opinions. The purpose to humiliate a certain group or to 
cause conflict and hostility are indicators of a speech which might constitute hate speech. In 
addition to this, the Court also takes into account the person’s position who charged with hate 
speech.112 In other words, the Court considers the applicant’s function in society. An 
interference with a politician’s or journalist’s expression requires very meticulous review 
because of their roles in a democratic society.113  
In its Incal v.Turkey case, for example, the Court took into consideration that the 
applicant was a politician and examined the specific circumstances of the case in a detailed 
way. In this case, the applicant was a member of the executive committee of the People’s 
Labour Party. The executive committee decided to distribute leaflets criticizing the measures 
taken by the local authorities. National authorities convicted the applicant because of the 
racist content of the leaflets which incite hatred and hostility. The Court examined the 
specific circumstances of the case. The Court held that the expressions in the leaflets call for 
the Kurdish population to raise certain political demands and noted that although the 
reference to ‘neighbourhood committees’ seems inexplicit, if read in the context, these 
expressions cannot be seen as incitement to the use of violence, hostility or hatred. The Court 
stated, ‘…it cannot be ruled out that such a text may conceal objectives and intentions 
different from the ones it proclaims. However, as there is no evidence of any concrete 
action…’.  The Court also noted that ‘… the circumstances of the present case are not 
comparable to those found in the Zana case (ibid.). Here the Court does not discern anything 
which would warrant the conclusion that Mr. Incal was in any way responsible for the 
problems of terrorism in Turkey…’ The Court concluded that the applicant’s conviction was 
disproportionate and thus unnecessary in a democratic society.114  
A similar approach with politicians has been adopted with journalists and the press in 
general. In its Jersild v Denmark case, for example, the Court made an explicit distinction 
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between expressions of the “Greenjackets” and the role of the journalist, who was the author 
of the documentary on them. According to the Court, “a significant feature of the present case 
is that the applicant did not make the objectionable statements himself but assisted in their 
dissemination in his capacity of television journalist responsible for a news programme.” 
Because of the applicant’s journalist status, the Court took into account the principles related 
to the freedom of the press, allowing a limited margin of appreciation to national authorities 
and decided that freedom of expression of the applicant was violated. 115 
The impact of the expressions is taken into consideration by the Court as a contextual 
factor. In its Karataş v. Turkey case, the Court found that to express views through poetry, 
which by definition addresses a very small audience, "limited  their potential impact on 
'national security,' 'public order' or 'territorial integrity.'116 
The Court also examines the circumstances in which the speech took place in hate 
speech cases. In the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, the question was whether the internet news 
portal has a responsibility in terms of offensive and violent comments which constitutes hate 
speech. The applicant company had been liable by the domestic courts, for the comments of 
readers below the article. The Court found that the determination of domestic courts was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Because the comments were highly offensive 
and amounted to an incitement to hatred and violence against individuals. The news portal 
failed to prevent the publication of these comments. The Court found no violation of Article 
10.117 
Another factor which the court takes into account is whether the author had a chance 
to correct the language he or she used. In its Gündüz v Turkey case, the Court emphasized 
that the applicant expressed his views on a lively public discussion. The applicant’s 
statements were balanced by the intervention of other participants in the program and their 
views were expressed as part of the pluralistic debate. The Court concerning some 
expressions of the applicant which can be considered as insulting stated that; “the applicant’s 
statements were made orally during a live television broadcast, so that he had no possibility 
of reformulating, refining or retracting them before they were made public”.118 
To sum up, the European Court, when applied Article 10 to hate speech cases, takes 
into consideration the specific circumstances of every case and assesses these concrete 
situations in the light of above-mentioned criteria and elements.  According to the Court; 
‘there can be no doubt that concrete expressions constituting hate speech, which may be 
insulting to particular individuals or groups, are not protected by Article 10 of the 
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Convention’.119 However, this does not mean that interferences to freedom of expression do 
not need to meet the criteria stated in Article 10(2) ECHR, as pointed out by the Strasbourg 
Court. Indeed, even with regard to hate speech interferences are only justified if they are 
‘prescribed by law’ and ‘provided that any “formalities”, “conditions”, “restrictions” or 
“penalties” imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.120 Application of the 
abuse clause is problematic in this respect. 
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CHAPTER 3 
-APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 17 IN HATE SPEECH CASES 
1. Creation and Rationale of the Abuse Clause: 
 
The idea of the abuse clause in international human rights law emerged after a short 
time from World War II. The first regulation in this context was Article 30 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This article became the direct inspiration of Article 
17 of the ECHR, a few years later, mentioning that; 
[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention. 
This article was the result of the political atmosphere that governed Europe during the 
drafting of the Convention. It constitutes the democracy’s defense against communist and 
fascist threats which are seen enemies of freedom. The article aims to provide a legal weapon 
for democracy in order to prevent the repetition of the threats of the past totalitarian regimes 
of national-socialist, fascist and communist.121 This understanding manifested itself in the 
European Commission of Human Rights’ Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands vs Germany 
(KPD Case) case.122 In this case, the Commission approved the proscribing of the Communist 
Party in Germany because the party had declared the goal of proletarian revolution and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. The Commission applied Article 17. This prevented the 
Communist Party from relying on those Convention articles that guarantee freedom of 
opinion, expression and association. In later decisions related to incitement to racial 
discrimination and anti-Semitism, the Commission and the Court repeatedly emphasized that 
the aim of the abuse clause is ‘to prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting in their own 
interests the principles enunciated by the Convention’.123 
2. The Scope of Abuse Clause 
 
For a clear understanding of the abuse clause, it should be noted that Article 17 cannot 
be invoked independently. It is always applied with a link to another Convention right as it 
can be understood from the wording of Article 17. There must be another right at stake which 
is deemed to be abused. In practice, its application is usually linked to the right to freedom of 
expression (Article 10 of ECHR).124 The aim of Article 17 is to prevent the intentions which 
                                                 
121 Ibid 57 
122 Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands vs Germany, 20 July 1957, European Commission on Human Rights 
(ECommHR), no. 250/57. 
123 Cannie, Vorhoof ( n 120) 57 
124 Ibid  58 
26 
 
target to benefit from the Convention’s provisions on contrary to Convention’s underlying 
values.125 
The abuse clause can be applied both directly and indirectly. Above mentioned KPD 
case is an example of direct application of Article 17 which categorically excludes certain 
expressions from the protection of Article 10 (guillotine effect). In such cases, the complaints 
of the applicant are simply excluded from the scope of Article 10.  If the Court uses Article 
17 as an interpretative aid while evaluating the necessity of interference under Article 10/2 of 
ECHR, this means the indirect application of Article 17. 126 
After the KPD case, the Commission and the Court have applied Article 17 when 
confronted with totalitarian expressions. They repeatedly pointed out that ‘National Socialism 
is a totalitarian doctrine incompatible with democracy and human rights and its adherents 
undoubtedly pursue aims of the kind referred to in Article 17 of the Convention’.127 In 
Kühnen v Germany decision the Commission state that; 
As regards the circumstances of the present case the Commission again notes the 
detailed findings of the Frankfurt Regional Court according to which the publications at 
issue, by advocating national socialism, aimed at impairing the basic order of freedom and 
democracy (…) The Commission accordingly considered that the applicant’s policy clearly 
contains elements of racial and religious discrimination (…) As a result, the Commission 
finds that the applicant is essentially seeking to use the freedom of information enshrined in 
Article 10 of the Convention as a basis for activities which are, as shown above, contrary to 
the text and spirit of the Convention and which, if admitted, would contribute to the 
destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.128 
 Although this case still shows a clear link with totalitarianism, in latter cases the 
Commission seems to expand the scope of Article 17 to every act which is ‘contrary to the 
text and spirit of the Convention’. Holocaust denial is most clearly seen in this broader scope. 
After Kühnen case, the Commission continuously applied Article 17 on Holocaust denial, 
which was consistently labeled as ‘contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention’. The 
Court considered this kind of speech as ‘discriminatory against Jewish people’129, a form of 
racial and religious discrimination,130 ‘a continuation of the former discrimination against the 
Jewish people’131, and even ‘incitement to hatred against Jews’.132 Furthermore, the Court 
acknowledged the denial as ‘an insult to the Jewish people’,133 ‘reproaching them with lying 
                                                 
125 Oetheimer ( n 88) 429 
126 Cannie, Vorhoof ( n120) 58 
127 Ibid 59 
128 Kühnen v Germany, 12 May 1988, European Commission on Human Rights,no. 12194/86. 
129 F.P. v. Germany, 29 March 1993, European Commission on Human Rights, no. 19459/92. 
130 Otto E.F.A. Remer v. Germany, 6 September 1995, European Commission on Human Rights, no. 25096/94; 
Honsik v Austria, 18 October 1995, European Commission on Human Rights no. 25062/94; Rebhandl v Austria, 
16 January 1996, European Commission on Human Rights no. 24398/94; and D.I. v Germany, 26 June 1996, 
European Commission on Human Rights no. 26551/95. 
131 Udo Walendy v Germany, 11 January 1995, European Commission on Human Rights no. 21128/92 
132 Otto E.F.A. Remer v Germany, supra note 130. 
133 Udo Walendy v Germany, supra note 131; and D.I. v Germany, supra note 130. 
27 
 
and extortion and thus portraying them as particularly abominable’134 hence injuring their 
reputation and rights.135 The Court in these cases, repeatedly found the applications related to 
freedom of expression manifestly ill-founded because of the clear necessity of the national 
limitations in a democratic society (indirect application of Article 17).136 
After the abolition of the Commission, the European Court continued to point out the 
specific status of Holocaust denial and revisionist speech. In its  Witzsch v Germany case 
which is a clear case of Holocaust denial, the Court applied Article 17 as an interpretative aid. 
The Court, in this case, decided that the interference was necessary in a democratic society 
under Article 10/2.137 Later, in its Garaudy v France case the Court emphasized that negation 
or revision of Holocaust which is a clearly established historical fact, undermines 
Convention’s underlying values that support the fight against racism and anti-Semitism.(the 
fight against anti-Semitism and racism here is clearly associated with the fundamental values 
protected by the Convention). As a result, Holocaust denial and crimes against humanity 
committed by the Nazis on the Jewish society entailed the direct application of Article 17.138 
The Court, in this case, stated that; 
‘the main content and general tenor of the applicant’s book, and thus its aim, are 
markedly revisionist and therefore run counter to the fundamental values of the Convention, 
as expressed in its Preamble, namely justice and peace. It considers that the applicant 
attempts to deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real purpose by using his right to 
freedom of expression for ends which are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention. 
Such ends, if admitted, would contribute to the destruction of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Convention. Accordingly, the Court considers that, in accordance with 
Article 17 of the Convention, the applicant cannot rely on the provisions of Article 10 of the 
Convention regarding his conviction for denying crimes against humanity.’139 
The European Court on some other occasions broadened the scope of Article 17. In 
some cases in which the applicants had been convicted for incitement to hatred against 
Jewish people, the Court applied Article 17 directly, although Holocaust denial or negationist 
expressions did not occur.140 For example in its Ivanov vs Russia decision the applicant 
claimed that Jews were conspiring against the Russians and had a fascist ideology. The Court 
stated that ‘‘(s)uch a general and vehement attack on one ethnic group is in contradiction with 
the Convention’s underlying values, notably tolerance, social peace and non-
discrimination’.141 Moreover, the Court also applied Article 17 directly in a case which is 
clearly outside of the broad sphere of Anti-semitizm. In its Norwood v the United Kingdom 
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case, a member of the British National Party had displayed a poster which includes the 
picture of Twin towers; with the words ‘ Islam out of Britain- Protect the British people’ and 
with the symbols of a crescent and a star in prohibition sign. The Court in its decision stated 
that; [s]uch a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group as a 
whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values proclaimed and 
guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.142 
The Court, therefore, decided that the applicant’s act does not enjoy the protection of Article 
10 and it constitutes an act within the scope of Article 17. 
To sum up, as explained above, the purpose of Article 17 was to protect democracies 
against new emerging totalitarian regimes. The analysis of the above-mentioned cases 
demonstrates that the Strasbourg organs have somewhat distanced itself from this purpose. 
The Convention organs have broadened the scope to all acts which are incompatible with the 
Convention’s underlying values. In this context the Court clearly associated the fight against 
anti-semitizm and racism as such with the fundamental values protected by the Convention. 
Furthermore in its Leroy v France case, the Court’s justification implied that in cases of 
racism, anti-semitizm and Islamophobia Article 17 can be applied.143 The present case law of 
the Court demonstrates that this implication has been realized and that Article 17 has been 
applied more extensively in hate speech cases than in the past, as will be explained in the next 
section. This broadening of the abuse clause is not compatible with the original rationale and 
general purpose of Article 17. 
3. Undesirable Effects of Article 17: 
 
Before mentioning the undesirable effects of the abuse clause, the effects of indirect 
and direct application of Article 17 needs to be clarified.  When the Court applies Article 17 
the balancing procedure which Article 10 requires is completely absent. Because the decision 
mostly depends on the national authorities’ assessment and exclusively relies on content 
examination. The expressions are simply excluded from the protection of Article 10. Because 
of the serious consequences of this approach, some supported the indirect application of the 
abuse clause. However, even if applied indirectly as an interpretative aid, it has similar 
undesirable effects.144 
Some of the Commission’s and the Court’s admissibility decisions indirectly applied 
abuse clause while assessing the necessity of the interference. Thus, necessity was examined 
in compliance with the underlying values of the Convention. However, even in such cases, 
the Court attaches considerable importance to the findings of the national authorities (in some 
cases clearly on the findings ‘as to the contents’ of the applicant’s publications). This causes 
a weighty application of Article 17145 and almost always automatically leads to the result that 
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the interference was necessary in a democratic society without efficiently balancing the case 
with the conflicting rights and interests, nor assessing it in its specific context with all factual 
and legally relevant elements. Formulations in such cases are far from responding to the 
specific circumstances of the case. 146 For example, in its Remer vs Germany decision, the 
Court stated that: 
(t)he public interests in the prevention of crime and disorder in the German 
population due to incitement to hatred against Jews, and the requirements of protecting their 
reputation and rights, outweigh, in a democratic society, the applicant’s freedom to impart 
publications denying the existence of the gassing of Jews in the concentration camps under 
the Nazi regime, and the allegations of extortion.147 
Although such a statement may seem correct and consistent in itself, it appears that 
the case did not sufficiently refer to the case’s own circumstances and special conditions 
concerning the alleged violation of freedom of expression. As a result, such reasoning is very 
similar to direct application of the abuse clause. When an action is accepted at the national 
level as a denial of the Holocaust or another activity or statement related to National 
Socialism, the application of Article 10 is automatically removed without any detailed 
examination of the whole circumstances of the case. In other words, although the assessment 
in such hate speech cases is formally made through Article 10, the strict conditions of Article 
10 become dysfunctional with the indirect application of Article 17.148 
a) Effects on the Context Examination: 
 
The application of Article 17 requires the exclusion of certain expressions from the 
scope of free speech theory, taking into account the content of the expression and gives little 
attention to the context of expressions.149 When the Court applied Article 17, the applicant 
cannot see that his/her expression judged in its specific context and all factual and legally 
relevant elements of the case is taken into consideration.150 In that context, Keane points out 
the significance of the examination of context, gives the Jersild case example in which the 
applicant was a Danish journalist. He was convicted because of aiding some youngsters (the 
so-called Greenjackets) in making racist comments amounting to incitement to hatred, by 
broadcasting these persons’ views. However, the programme was in the context of an 
important discussion on movements against immigration in Denmark. Although the Court 
seemed to apply Article 17 in the content of the application151, the case was considered under 
Article 10(2). As a result, it was understood that Jersild ‘did not make the objectionable 
                                                 
146 Cannie, Vorhoof ( n 120) 68 
147 Otto E.F.A. Remer v Germany, supra note 131. 
148 Cannie, Vorhoof ( n120) 68 
149 Paolo Lobba, ‘Holocaust Denial Before the European Court of Human Rights’, 26(1) European Journal of 
International Law (2015) p. 242.   
150 Cannie, Vorhoof ( n120) 69 
151 See in this regard the Court’s statement that ‘(t)here can be no doubt that the remarks (…) were more than 
insulting to members of the targeted groups and did not enjoy the protection of Article 10’, Jersild v Denmark, 
supra note 101, para. 35. 
30 
 
statements himself, but assisted in their dissemination in his capacity of television 
journalist’.152 Keane mentions about this case; 
The ‘balancing process’ and analysis of the element of proportionality would have 
been removed if the case had been examined under Article 17; indeed Jersild would not have 
passed the admissibility stage, and based on content alone, the Danish State would have been 
justified in prosecuting the journalist, irrespective of the context of the news piece.153 
Therefore, applying article 17 to hate speech cases damages the substantial safeguards 
on matters of freedom of expression and removes the requirement for detailed engagement 
with the contextual elements. Categorical exclusion of expression from the scope of Article 
10 based on solely content, seems inappropriate to arrive a consistent legal position.154 
b) Disregarding Proportionality: 
 
In the Court’s case law, the proportionality of the interference is rarely taken into 
account when Article 17 is applied.155In some cases, although the sentence was 
imprisonment, the Court completely ignored the proportionality test.156 Disregarding 
proportionality in such cases is not compatible with the case-law of the Court which gives 
high importance to proportionality in article 10 cases. Disproportionality is a leading factor in 
the finding of a violation of freedom of expression. In some cases, although the Court 
acknowledges the pressing social need, sometimes even because of incitement to hatred, 
because of the severity of the sanction (for instance sentence of imprisonment)157, the Court 
found the interference disproportionate and decided that the freedom of expression of the 
applicant violated.158 For example, in its Mehmet Cevher Ilhan v Turkey decision, the Court 
found that the applicant’s publication to be incitement to hatred and discrimination. The 
Court also considered the interference had a legitimate aim and responded to a pressing social 
need. However, the Court found the sentence of imprisonment which was more than 2 years 
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disproportionate. Thus the Court decided that Article 10 has been violated.159 It can be said 
that the application of abuse clause renders persons vulnerable to interference which is 
disproportionate to their freedom of expression. 
c) Structural Dangers: 
 
Existing case-law of the European Court allows the States margin of appreciation in 
evaluating whether the measures taken is necessary in cases of hate speech. As explained in 
the previous chapter this margin is not limitless. However, the application of Article 17 
removes the need for member States to justify the interference sufficiently and appropriately. 
It further diminishes the Court's role in guaranteeing a narrow understanding and convincing 
establishment of restrictions. Moreover, as a further step, States may wish to consider many 
actions within the broad and vague definition of being contrary to the underlying values of 
the convention.160 According to Hare; this ‘creates a serious risk that the state will (especially 
in times of particular religious or cultural sensitivity) be able to restrict or prohibit with 
impunity the expression of unpopular views by those who do not espouse mainstream liberal 
positions’161. 
4. Unnecessary for Protection of Democracy: 
 
The Court justifies the application of abuse clause in responding to the acts related to 
National Socialism or inspired by this ideology, especially Holocaust denial. The Court 
points out in its decisions such activities are contrary to the Convention’s underlying values 
and clearly dangerous for democracies. However, it is also true with regard to the expressions 
that (are believed to) incite violence or terrorism. Because these activities damage the 
foundations and values of democracy as well. These are also more likely to endanger citizens, 
seriously destroying their enjoyment of their rights and freedoms and lastly their right to 
human dignity that is at the basis of the Convention. The Court examines these kinds of 
expressions under Article 10, without referring to the abuse clause, which enables the Court 
to take all specific circumstances of the case into account.162 Moreover, the Court examines 
the cases related to approval or glorification of terrorist acts under Article 10 without 
reference to Article 17.163  
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On the other hand, several cases related to hate speech and incitement to hatred in 
which abuse clause is not applied, demonstrate that the goals underlying abuse clause are 
likewise achieved under the speech-protective scope of Article 10.164 Thus, it is rightly 
questionable that is it necessary to apply Article 17 in order to protect democracy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
-ECtHR JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING HATE SPEECH (CASE LAW 
EXAMPLES) 
1) How the Court Deal With Various Forms of Hate Speech Cases 
 
All applications related to hate speech have been submitted in the scope of Article 10 
of the Convention. These applicants alleged violation of the rights to freedom of expression 
ensured in this article. Some of those applications have been declared admissible and 
considered by the Court. The Court assessed these applications on a case by case basis.165 
a) Xenophobia and Racial Discrimination: 
 
In its Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v.The Netherlands case which was related to 
xenophobia and racial discrimination, the Commission found that applicants were inspired by 
the overall aim to remove all non-white people from the Netherlands. The Commission 
applied Article 17 and the applicants’ complaints under Article 10 were rejected because of 
being incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.166 
In its Feret v Belgium case which was another example of xenophobia and racial 
discrimination the Court did not apply Article 17 and assessed the case under article 10. In 
this case, the applicant was the chairman of a party and a member of the Parliament. During 
the election campaign, some leaflets were distributed which include ‘Stand up against the 
Islamification of Belgium’ Stop the sham integration policy’ and ‘send non-European job-
seekers home’. The applicant was convicted of incitement to racial hatred. He claimed that 
his freedom of expression has been violated. In the Court’s view, the contents of the 
impugned leaflets did not justify the application of Article 17. However, the Court found no 
violation of Article 10 of Convention. The Court stated that the applicant’s comments were 
conducive to rise feelings of distrust, hatred towards foreigners and thus explicitly amounted 
to incitement to hatred. The applicant’s conviction had been justified in the interest of 
preventing disorder and protecting the right of members of the immigrant community.167 
In another case related to xenophobia and racial discrimination, in R.L.v. Switzerland 
case, the Court used Article 17 as an interpretative aid. The case was about the seizure of two 
CDs and three musical records containing racist propaganda. The Court examined the 
applicant’s complaint under Article 10. In this respect, implicitly relying on Article 17, the 
Court found that the materials were directed against the Convention’s underlying values and 
the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.168 Above mentioned Jersild v. 
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Denmark169 decision was also an example of Article 17 used as aid in interpretation, in the 
context of xenophobia. 
b. Hatred on ethnic grounds 
In its W.P. and Others v. Poland case which was related to anti-Semitism, the 
applicants were prevented from establishing an association. According to the Court ‘the 
memorandum of association alleging the persecution of Poles by the Jewish minority and the 
existence of inequality between them could be seen as reviving anti-Semitism.’ The Court 
applied article 17 and found the application inadmissible.170 Above mentioned Pavel Ivanov 
v. Russia 171decision was also an example of application of Article 17 in the context of anti-
Semitizm. 
In its Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania case which is another example of hatred on 
ethnic grounds and also anti-Semitism, the Court examined applicants’ allegations under 
Article 10. In this case the applicant was issued an administrative warning because of his 
publication which refers to the Jews and Poles as the perpetrators of war crimes and genocide 
against the Lithuanians. Some copies of the publication which has not been sold were 
confiscated. The Court found no violation of Article 10, because the statements were inciting 
hatred against the Jews and Poles. In addition they were capable of causing serious concern 
for the national authorities. The Court did not raise the question of whether Article 17 could 
be applied.172 
In its another case related to hatred on ethnic grounds, in Stomakhin v Russia case, the 
Court found that the statements of the applicant abuse the typical and characteristic of all 
Russians and Orthodox believers. The Court implicitly relied on Article 17 and observed that 
such broad attacks on ethnic and religious groups wer not compatible with the Convention’s 
underlying values, especially tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.173 
c. Homophobia: 
The Court in its Vejdeland and others v Sweden case which was related to 
homophobia applied Article 10 regarding the applicants’ complaints. “This case concerned 
the applicants’ conviction for distributing in an upper secondary school approximately 100 
leaflets” (by leaving them in the school lockers). These leaflets were offensive to 
homosexuals. The leaflets contained “allegations that homosexuality was a ‘deviant sexual 
proclivity’, had ‘a morally destructive effect on the substance of society’ and was responsible 
for the development of HIV and AIDS... The Court found that these statements had 
constituted serious and prejudicial allegations, even if they had not been a direct call to 
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hateful acts. The Court stressed that discrimination based on sexual orientation was as serious 
as discrimination based on race, origin or colour. It concluded that there had been no 
violation of Article 10.”174 
In another case related to homophobia, in Molnar v.Romania, the Court used Article 
17 as an interpretative aid. The applicant had convicted because of the distribution of posters 
which includes statements against the homosexual minority such as “Romania needs children, 
not homosexuals”. According to the Court, by the reason of Article 17, found the applicant’s 
act was not compatible with democracy and human rights and Article 10 was not violated.175 
d. Religious Hatred 
In its Soulas and others v France case which was related to Islamophobia, the 
applicants have been convicted because of the publication of a book which defends the idea 
of ethnic re-conquest war against Muslims who were overtaking Europe. The book presented 
the Muslim immigrants as criminally minded, abusing welfare benefits, perpetrating ritual 
rapes of European women and, generally, animated by Francophobia and anti-European 
racism. According to the Court, the French Court’s assessment was sufficient that the content 
of the book and the terms used demonstrate the intention to give readers to a feeling of 
hostility against the Muslim communities as the main enemy in a future war. However, 
according to the Court, the statements in the book were not serious enough to require the 
application of Article 17. The Court applied article 10 to the applicant’s allegations. 
Nevertheless, the Court allowed a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities taking 
into account the problem of social integration of immigrants and found no violation of Article 
10. 176 
In its Seurot v.France case which was also related to Islamophobia, the Court applied 
Article 17 as an interpretative aid. The applicant was a school teacher who was convicted on 
account of an article which published in the school newspaper. In the article, there were 
statements such as ‘unassimilable Muslim hordes”, which had turned up, “building mosques 
everywhere” and imposing headscarves. The Court examined whether the applicant’s claims 
should be removed from the protection of Article 10 by virtue of article 17. The Court 
decided that the application is manifestly ill-founded. According to the Court, the explicit 
racist content of the article was not consistent with the duties and responsibilities of teachers 
representing authority in the eyes of the students.177 
In its abovementioned Norwood v. United Kingdom178 decision which is another 
example of Islamophobia, the Court applied Article 17. The Court also applied Article 17 in 
its Belkacem v. Belgium case which was related to religious hatred towards non-muslims. The 
applicant convicted because of the videos on the YouTube platform in which he called to 
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overpower non-Muslims, teach them a lesson and fight them. According to the Court such a 
general and severe attack which stirs up violence and hatred towards all non-Muslim is 
incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination. By virtue of 
Article 17, the applicant’s complaint was rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the 
provisions of the Convention.179 
2) An Article 10 or an Article 17 Approach: 
 
In its Glimmerveen180 decision, the Court directly applied article 17 related to racist 
hate speech, in its Feret v Belgium decision the applicant enjoyed the protection of Article 
10181, while in R.L.v. Switzerland 182, the Court applied Article 17 in conjunction with Article 
10/2. These examples which are all related to xenophobia and racial discrimination 
demonstrates the debatable characteristic of the case law with regard to hate speech, in 
particular, article 10 and article 17 dichotomy. 
There are different views related to the application of Article 10 and Article 17 in hate 
speech cases. One argument is that all forms of hate speech should be excluded from the 
protection of Article 10/1. Stanley Fish argues that; ‘there is no such thing as free speech, that 
is, speech that has as its rationale nothing more than its own production’. In the context of 
hate speech, he emphasizes that defending hate speech in order to defend the principle of 
freedom of expression is a mistake. Accordingly; 
‘The only way to fight hate speech or racist speech is to recognise it as the speech of 
your enemy and what you do in response to the speech of your enemy is not prescribe a 
medication for it but attempt to stamp it out.’183 
David Keane mentions that Fish’s approach is similar to Article 17 approach to hate 
speech. In the preamble of ECHR, it can be seen that it is aligned against the sentiments 
stated by Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek, the Greenjackets and Kuhnen, as well as those who 
question historical facts related to Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust. Keane expresses that 
‘Perhaps all examples of such speech should simply be treated as anathema under Article 17, 
permitting both individuals and States to interfere in order to prevent its dissemination purely 
on the basis of content, and irrespective of the aim of the disseminator, as is currently the 
Court’s practice in relation to Holocaust denial.’184 Keane also questioned whether all hate 
speech should be treated equally, under Article 10, or under Article 17. However, he himself 
left this open-ended.185 
Cannie and Voorhoof suggest that all hate speech without exception must be treated 
under the speech protective framework of Article 10 ECHR (with emphasis on the necessity 
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test of Article 10/2). This is preferable in terms of both democratic and human rights 
perspective. Accordingly abuse clause should not have any impact in such cases. They call 
the Court to clearly formulate the reasons that support the conclusion with regard to the 
necessity of limiting the expression at issue, as to the specific circumstances of every case. 
Accordingly, all legally and factual elements of the concrete case must be taken into account, 
such as context, content, purpose, proportionality of the interference. They argue that abuse 
clause must be seen ‘as a symbolic declaration in the light of which the whole Convention 
should be read and interpreted’186 
There is another view which Clotilde Pegorier mentions related to genocide denial; 
accordingly, for the sake of consistency, the extension of the application of Article 17 to 
cases other than those involving denial of Holocaust is disadvantageous, given that it may to 
some extent prevent denial explanations from being fully integrated with all and legally 
relevant factors. On the other hand, applying Article 10 to all such speech would be a harsh 
approach that undermines the role of Article 17 in protecting democracy and human dignity. 
She suggests ‘a more-mixed approach whereby Article 17 is applied not as a category tool of 
decision-making through its guillotine effect, but rather as an interpretative principle – within 
the framework supplied by Article 10.’ Thus, Article 17 retains its role in the maintenance of 
democratic order and broader consideration of contextual factors is provided.187 
Vesna Alaburic puts forward another argument. She also mentions the lack of 
consistency related to the application of Article 17 in the European Court’s case-law and 
suggests that when hate speech is at stake, abuse clause should be applied only in very 
exceptional situations such as directly calling for or inciting violence against certain 
vulnerable groups. Accordingly, in all other hate speech cases, Article 10 should be 
applied.188  
  CONCLUSION 
Although the European Court has dealt with numerous hate speech cases to date, its 
jurisprudence regarding hate speech remains controversial and suffers from certain 
deficiencies. Firstly, applying Article 17 consistently in Holocaust denial cases raises the 
question of why it is not so strictly implemented in other hate speech cases and therefore 
gives a contradictory message. 
In addition, as can be seen from the case law examples related to several forms of hate 
speech, the Court seems to expand the scope of Article 17. Even in the same form of hate 
speech, sometimes Article 10, sometimes Article 17 and sometimes Article 17 as an 
interpretative aid is applied by the Court. However, the interpretation and application of 
Article 17 and Article 10 in such cases do not provide clear criteria which determine which 
activities/acts fall within the scope of each article. The case law does not put forward 
sufficient indicators regarding how to draw the line between the application of Article 10 and 
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Article 17 in hate speech cases. This makes the Court’s law unpredictable and to some extent 
open to arbitrariness.  
Furthermore, the application of Article 17 in hate speech cases constitutes a potential 
threat to freedom of expression of individuals. When the Court applies Article 17 to hate 
speech cases, the significant elements of the case such as context of the expression, status and 
purpose of the applicant are not sufficiently examined. The Court mostly focuses on the 
content of the expression and mostly relies on the national authorities’ assessments. 
Moreover, the proportionality of the measure which is of vital importance in order to ensure 
the right to freedom of expression is very rarely considered.  
These controversies and negative effects of applying Article 17, the similar 
undesirable effects of the indirect application of Article 17 make the application of abuse 
clause in hate speech cases disadvantageous. Therefore, in order to make the Court’s case-
law consistent and predictable, in order to ensure that an applicant enjoys a detailed 
examination of his/her allegations, applying the speech protective framework of Article 10 to 
all hate speech cases seems the best solution. 
Lastly, in addition to Article 10 and Article 17 dichotomy, another problematic area 
regarding hate speech case law is the lack of a clear definition of hate speech. This deficiency 
makes it difficult to distinguish hate speech from other hateful discourses. Absence of a 
coherent and comprehensive definition also makes the ECtHR case-law inconsistent, 
unpredictable and open to confusion. Moreover, the Court has a role to contribute to the 
harmonization of legislative and judicial practices in the human rights field among CoE 
member States. However, in this respect, it can be said that the Court case-law does not help 
enough to national authorities in establishing common legal standards related to hate speech. 
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